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Central R. R. Company v. City of Bucyrus.2 Applying the rule of
that decision to the instant case should we say that the corporation and
the majority stockholders, having invoked the provisions of Ohio G.C.
sec. 8623-65, will not be permitted to claim the unconstitutionality of
any part of Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, because the latter section is made
a part of the former one? The court answers this by saying that the
one section is not made a part of the other, that they are separate and
distinct and cover different subjects, Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-65 author-
izing the corporation to sell its assets upon a favorable vote of the stock-
holders, and Ohio G.C. sec 8623-72 dealing with the rights of dis-
senting stockholders after the vote.
This view of the court seems to ignore the intent of the legislature
as e-idenced by the language of the statute, and the obvious purpose of
protecting minority stockholders. The last paragraph of Ohio. G.C.
sec. 8623-65 states, "Dissenting shareholders, whether or not entitled
to vote, shall be entitled to relief in the manner and under the conditions
hereinafter provided." A sale of substantially all of the assets of an
Ohio corporation may be had only by compliance with this section, and
when they authorized the sale the majority impliedly agreed to provide
for dissenters. To what relief are the dissenters entitled? Why, to that
"hereinafter provided," and the only relief hereinafter provided is that
provided in Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, which is entitled, "Dissenting
Shareholders." J.M.B.
CORPORATIONS - VESTED RIGHTS IN ACCRUED CUMULATIVE
DIVIDENDS- POWER OF CANCELLATION UNDER
NEW AMENDMENT TO STATUTES
By the articles of incorporation of the defendant corporation, organ-
ized in 1923, certain shares of preferred stock were issued with 7%
cumlative dividends. In 1935, the articles were amended to provide for
an exchange of the first issue carrying 7%o, for the new issue of 5 ,
with a 22 % dividend on the new stock payable immediately, and also
for the issue of one share of new common, admittedly worth about
$6.oo, in cancellation of all accrued and unpaid dividends on the old
preferred, which amounted to $24.50. The plaintiff, a holder of the
original preferred, refused to exchange his old stock for the new issue
and sued to enjoin the payment of dividends on the common stock
until the unpaid cumulated but undeclared dividends, which had ac-
iz6 Ohio St. 558, 1S6 N.E. 450 (1933). In this case the court, having declared
the Etatute involved to be unconstitutional, nevertheless declared that a party claiming
contitutional invalidity while having received and still holding the fruits of an agreement
made under the statute is estopped from questioning its unconstitutionality.
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crued prior to the amendment to the articles, were paid. The court held
that while the plaintiff must either exchange his old preferred for the
new stock or take advantage of the appraisal statute, he could not be
compelled to accept the common stock in extinguishment of his right to
cumulated dividends accrued before the amendment became effective.1
Under similar statutes, it has several times been held that a cor-
poration may amend its articles so as to call in outstanding stock to be
exchanged for a new issue carrying a lower dividend rate.2 The impor-
tance of the present decision lies in its effect upon amendments to articles
for the purpose of wiping out accrued dividends. If, by amendment, a
holder of preferred may be compelled to accept a six dollar share of stock
for $24.50 of accrued dividends, it is a simple step further to say that
those dividends may be destroyed entirely.
The Ohio Constitution has an usual provision reserving to the state
the power to alter or repeal corporation charters.' Under this section
it has been held that when a shareholder buys his stock, he does so with
a full understanding that his rights may be altered by subsequent acts
of the legislature.4 At the time the principal case was decided the corpor-
ation statutes provided that charters might be amended so as to "change
the express terms and provisions of any class or classes of shares; or of
any series."5 This was interpreted to mean that the provisions of any
class or series could be changed as to future rights and privileges only.
Since the statute said nothing about accrued undeclared and unpaid
dividends, any amendment to diminish or to extinguish them was with-
out statutory authorization. There is an implication in the opinion that
if the statute had specifically mentioned wiping out accrued dividends,
such action would have been legal, if the dividends had accrued after
the effective date of the statute. Since the principal case was decided,
the legislature has amended the corporation statute so that now, in
unequivocal terms, a corporation may amend its articles so as not only
to diminish, but to destroy all accrued unpaid dividends.'
' Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N.E. (2d) 281, 14
Ohio Op. 276, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 6z5 (1939). For contemporary comment see (note)
(1940) 25 CORN. L.Q. 43!.
'Williams v. National Pump Corporation, 46 Ohio App. 427, x88 N.E. 756, 39 Ohio
L. Rep. 469 (1933). Keith v. State ex rel. Mills, 113 Ohio St. 491. Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 12z AtI. 696. See generally 7 FLrCHa R
Cyc. CoRP. (PRm. En.) sec. 3696.
a Art. XIII, Sec. z.
'Williams v. National Pump Corp., supra, note 2. Cf. Geiger v. American Seeding
Machine Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594, 79 A.L.R. 614, 28 Ohio N.P.C.N.S.) 20.
'Osso G.C. sec. 8623-14 (i). See note 6 for statute as changed.
6Onso G.C. sec 8623-14 (i): "In particular, without prejudice to the generality
of such power of amendment, a corporation may by amendment . . . change any or all
of the express terms and provisions or designations of issued or unissued shares of any
class kor series; which change, if desired, may include the discharge, adjustment or
elimination of rights to accrued undeclared cumulative dividends on any such issue.
(Effective July 24, 1939).
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A month prior to the decision in the Harbine case, the Eighth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals decided the case of Vulcan Corporation v. West-
hebner & Co.' There, the plaintiff had amended its articles so as to
compel the holders of 6% outstanding preferred with cumulative divi-
dends to exchange one share of the original for one share of cumulative
preferred bearing 42% dividends, and one-half share of 3% con-
vertible preferred, and one dollar in cash. The surrender of the old
stock and the acceptance of the new constituted a waiver of all rights to
accrued undeclared dividends amounting to $57 per share. The defend-
ant, holding 44 shares of the original 6% cumulative preferred, upon
being duly notified of the amendment, wrote in answer: "I hereby
notify you that it is my desire to retain the old preferred stock." The
plaintiff asked that the defendant be enjoined from asserting any claim
or right in opposition to the plan of recapitalization. The court held
that the defendant was concluded by the two-thirds vote of the share-
holders from making any claim in opposition to the plan, and that since
he had not asked for an appraisal he, along with the other shareholders,
must accept the new stock, which acceptance constituted a waiver of
accrued dividends.' In this case, as in the Harbine case, the court based
its decision in large part on a dictum in Johnson v. Lamprecht that the
remedy offered in the appraisal statute was not exclusive "in instances
where fraud and illegality are concerned." In the Harbine case, it was
claimed that the proposal was illegal, it being without statutory authori-
zation. In the Vulcan case, the court makes specific mention of the fact
that "there is no claim of fraud or illegality concerning the plan of
recapitalization nor is any claim made that the proposal was not for the
best interests of the corporation."
Does a shareholder have a "vested right" in accrued undeclared and
unpaid dividends of which he cannot be divested by charter amendment?
The court in the Vulcan case does not meet this issue squarely because
the defendant claimed he had a vested right in the stock itself as well as
in the dividends which had accumulated, and he apparently was unwill-
ing to accept the fair cash value of his stock. There is an intimation that
he did have such a right of which he could not be divested if he had
acted in compliance with the appraisal section when the court says, "The
14 Ohio Op. 274, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 69. (93S); appeal dismissed 135 Ohio St.
136 (1939): "for the reason on debatable constitutional question is involved in
the cau.,e." Note the appeal was dismissed after the decision in the Harbine case.
'The court emphasized the fact that the dividends had never been declared. In
this it followvs the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand dissenting in Harry v. Pioneer
Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (zd) 332, 336 (1933) in interpreting the Delaware statute,
which interpretation was not followed by the Delaware court.
See OHso G.C. sec. 8623-72 for appraisal provisions. See comment, (894 o ) 6
O.S.L.J. 3o8, supra.
1 33 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. (zd) 127, 11 Ohio Op. 297 (1938).
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fair market value of defendant's stock one day before the adoption of the
plan of recapitalization necessarily included the value of the stock with
the accumulated dh'udends." (Italics supplied.) In the Harbine case,
it is recognized that a shareholder has some right in accumulated divi-
dends of which he may not be divested when, after calling attention to
the rulings in Delaware and New Jersey that a stockholder has a "vested
interest" in cumulated dividends, the court said: "We have difficulty
in following the designation 'has a vested interest.' However, by what-
ever name known, it is an existing substantial right, and has a prospective
value. Whether or not it will ever materialize, depends on whether or
not the company makes profits in such an amount as to be available to
pay the current and cumulative dividends."
The Delaware cases dealing with the cancellation of dividends are
worthy of note. In Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,"° the corporation
was organized in 1925 with a provision in its charter that it might
"exercise all powers which might thereafter be conferred by the state by
way of amendment of the act under which the corporation was created."
In 1927, section 26 of the corporation statute was revised to read as
follows: "Any corporation of this state . . . may . . . amend its cer-
tificate of incorporation . . . by changing the number, par value, desig-
nations, preferences, or relative, participating, optional, or other special
rights of the shares, or the qualifications, limitations, or restrictions, of
such rights." (Italics supplied.)" The corporation amended its charter
destroying all accrued and unpaid dividends. While the lower court
held it might accomplish this result, 2 on appeal the decision was reversed
and it was held that the statute was not broad enough to permit of can-
cellation of dividends accrued before the amendment to the charter by
the corporation.23
While the federal court, in construing the statute in an earlier case,
found that it was broad enough to encompass such a change,' 4 the Dela-
ware court, when the problem was presented to it, refused to give it such
a broad construction. In Consolidated Film Industries, Inc., v. John-
son,'5 the corporation was organized after the amendment to section 26.
But the court held that that fact was not sufficient to warrant the can-
cellation of accrued dividends. When its attention was specifically called
to differences in the statutes under which the corporation in the Keller
case was organized and that in force when the Consolidated Film Cor-
30 19o At. x35 (Del. Sup. Ct., 3936).
"Dx.L. REV sED CODE zo58 sec. z6 (1935).
a Supra, note 10.
' Harr v. Mechanical Pioneer Corp., supra, note 8.
25 197 Ad. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1937).
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poration was organized, the court said: "It (the statute as amended)
authorizes nothing more than it purports to authorize, the amendment of
charters. The cancellation of dividends already accrued through passage
of time is not an amendment of a charter. It is the destruction of a right
in the nature of a debt. . . .The rights of cumulative preferred share-
holders to the stipulated dividends accrued to them by virtue of the
contract. The right exists and persists." This theory of vested rights in
dividends had been articulated in an earlier case when the court said,
"Considering the relations of the stockholders inter sese . . . there is
every reason to hold that as soon as the agreed dividend which the pre-
ferred stockholder is to receive is matured by time, a right to its ultimate
payment as against those who have agreed to its payment becomes a
vested right. It is a present property interest." 6
Ohio has never adopted this theory of vested rights in accrued cumu-
lative dividends in toto. In Johnson v. Lamprecht, the court had only
to decide whether a prior preferred stock could be issued on which divi-
dends were legally payable before dividends cumulated prior to this
issue were paid to the original preferred. While deciding this under a
strict interpretation of the agreement as set forth in the stock certificate,
the court discussed at some length the theory of vested rights. Said the
court, speaking through Judge Gorman, "It is claimed that the can-
cellation of an accumulated and unpaid dividend of a preferred holder
impairs a vested right. If there is a surplus, the action is usually enjoined.
If on the other hand, there is a need for additional capital, the corporate
necessity for continued existence overshadows the claims of the minority
holders to dividends. In determining the question, courts have con-
sidered both the equities and the business situation, attempted to weigh
and balance them, and then decided the controversy." In that case, the
matter of vested rights was not primarily important since the exchange of
the old preferred for the new (less accumulated dividends) was purely
optional. Vested rights problems arise where the exchange with the
accompanying cancellation of accrued dividends is compulsory. Although
the entire discussion is obiter, the court seems to be saying that where
there is a sufficient surplus to pay dividends and compulsion is used to
cancel those already accrued, the court will apply the vested rights theory
to protect the shareholder, and that the dividends may be destroyed
where there is not a sufficient surplus.
Up to this point, the matter of vested rights has been decided on the
basis of statutes which were held to be prospective in effect only, and
not retrospective.' 7 Both the Delaware and the Ohio statutes authorize
"AMorris v. American Public Utilities Co., q. Del. Ch. 136, 149 (1923).
1 See principally in this connection Consolidated Film Industries Inc. v. Johnson,
supra, note 16. Contrast with this the much more liberal attitude shown by the court
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corporations to make amendments to their charters in regard to certain
preferences. In the absence of unambiguous statements to that effect, the
courts have refused to give the statutes such broad interpretations as to
allow, without more, a cancellation of dividends which had accrued."
All attempts in Ohio to date have been denied on the ground of illegality
because there was no statutory authorization for the cancellation of divi-
dends accrued through passage of time.' The new provision specifically
reserves in the corporation the power to cancel accrued dividends."0
The question may arise as to whether a corporation must have been
organized subsequent to the passage of the statute permitting amendment
of the charter to cancel accrued dividends in order to benefit by it, or
whether it is necessary that the stock be issued after its effective date.
Inasmuch as amendments to general corporation statutes become part of
the charter of a corporation as of the day of promulgation, it would
seem to be unnecessary that a corporation be organized after the passage
of the statute. While the statute would have no retrospective effect as
to dividends which had accrued before its effective date, it would apply
to all dividends accrued in the future. The time of issuing the certificates
of stock would not seem to be controlling. "Purchasers of stock are
chargeable with notice that the legislature may make provision for
amendments and alterations and when made all certificates of stock,
whether issued before or after, are brought within its provisions."'" It
would seem from the decisions reviewed that the new amendment will
not be effective to cancel dividends accrued prior to its enactment, but
that all dividends which accrued subsequent to its passage may be can-
celled by proper amendment to the charter of the corporation, and this
without regard to when the corporation was organized, or when the
stock was first issued or acquired by the holder.
D.R.T.
in regard to cancellation of dividends in connection with merger. It will be noted here
that the court interpreted the statute dealing with merger and consolidation as having
retrospective effect. Federal United Corporation v. Havender et al., ii A. (zd) 331
(Del. Sup. Ct., 1940) Cf. Goodison v. North American Securities Co., 40 Ohio App. 85,
178 N.E. 29; Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 528, 153 Atl. 402 (193o).
'See generally 7 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. (PERM. ED.) sec. 3688, 9696 and cases
cited supra, notes 3, 5, 12 and 14.
"
9 Williams case; Harbine case, supra, notes 2 and 3.
'Supra, note 6.
' Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., supra, note z. "A purchaser of corporate
stock takes it with full knowledge that provisions contained in the certificate may be
altered or amended."
